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- - ________ ..., ___ ;,. ______ __. ........ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S~-\.LT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-YS.-
S~-\.~fjiiA B. PERKINS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7814 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, SAMMIA B. PERKINS, was con-
victed by a jury in the City Court for operating a dis-
orderly house in violation of Section 4816 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, and from this 
conviction she appealed to the Third Judicial District 
Court where, after a trial de novo, she was again con-
victed of the same offense by jury. From this conviction 
the said Defendant appeals to this court. 
The facts substantially developed by the evidence 
of said case are as follows : 
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That the City Cmnmission and Police Department 
of Salt Lake City had received complaints concerning 
the operation of a rooming house located at 7 4 7 South 
Second East in Salt Lake City (R. 32, 33). Pursuant 
thereto periodic checks were made of said premises by 
the Police Department of Salt Lake City. It was found 
that a 1nixed group of both white and colored minors 
were frequenting this place at late hours of the night and 
that music was played in said place that could be heard 
for a distance of fifty to seventy-five feet therefrom (R. 
6, 7 and 8). That the said home contained many whiskey 
bottles and glasses frmn which whiskey had been drunk 
(R. 10 and 11). That on or about May 12, 1951, the Police 
Deparhnent conducted a raid of said premises and that 
two police officers observed the Defendant beckon to a 
white and colored man who approached her on the front 
porch. After some conversation, the Defendant motioned 
these two men to a side door (R. 18, 19). That the police 
officers went to the rear of this home, and, looking 
through the window, observed a white man and a colored 
woman in the act of sexual relations (R. 19, 20). That a 
further examination of this house disclosed many whis-
key bottles and glasses (R. 22, 23). That the Defendant 
and her children were present that night, but that her 
husband was not (R. 24). This course of conduct had 
continued over a long period of time and had disturbed 
the neighbors (R. 44, 45, 46 and 48). That the Defend-
ant and her husband jointly purchased and operated this 
home (R. 53, 54). However, he worked separate and 
apart from the home so that the Defendant actively con-
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ducted the business of running the home. The Defend-
ant's husband was not h01ne at the tin1e of the raid on 
~lay 1:!, 1951 (R. 6:2). The Defendant told the officers 
that he had left for work (R. 76, 77). At the conclu-
sion of the testimony the Defendant's counsel requested 
two instructions. The Court denied the first requested 
instruction (R. 15 ), the Defendant's second requested 
instruction being as follows : 
''DEFENDANT'S REQUEST NO 2 
You are instructed that under the law of this 
state, a married woman is not capable of comn1i t-
ting a crime, where the punishment is less than 
death, or treason, while acting under the threats, 
command or coercion of her husband, and in this 
respect you are instructed that if you believe 
from the evidence, that the defendant was a mar-
ried woman, living with her husband on the 12th 
day of May, 1951, and committed any of the of-
fenses charged in the (three) complaints under 
the command, influence, coercion or threats of her 
husband, then, and in that event, it is your duty 
to acquit her on each charge. 
You are further instructed that if you have a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not she was 
so acting under such influence of her husband, 
you should acquit her." 
The said Defendant's second requested instruction 
was given substantially by the Court as its Instruction 
No. 9 (R. 101, 102) as follows : 
"No. 9: You are further instructed that un-
der the law of this state a married woman is not 
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capable of committing a crime such as the ones 
charged against this defendant while she is acting 
under the threats, command, or coercion of her 
husband; and in this respect you are instructed 
that if you believe from the evidence that the 
defendant was a married woman, living with her 
husband, on the 12th day of May, 1951, and com-
mitted any of the offenses charged against her 
while under the command, influence, coercion, or 
threats of her husband, then and in that ~vent it is 
your duty to acquit her of these charges or of the 
charge which you believe that she committed 
while acting under her husband's threats, com-
rnands, coercion, or influence. You are further 
instructed that if you have a reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not she was so acting, you ought 
to acquit her. In other words, she does not have 
the burden of convincing you by even a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that she was acting 
under the influence of her husband. In order for 
you to find her guilty, you must find that she was 
not under the influence, and if you find she was, 
you must acquit her, or if you have a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not she was under his in-
fluence, you must acquit her." 
After the verdict, the Defendant filed a Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment (R. 114) and a ~lotion For a New 
Trial (R. 115), which motions were denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR THIS MATTER ON APPEAL. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
POINT Ill. 
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION UNDER UTAH 
LAW THAT A MARRIED WOMAN, WHILE COMMITTING 
A CRIME, IS ACTING UNDER THE COMMAND, COER-
CION OR INFLUENCE OF HER HUSBAND. 
ARGl':JIENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR THIS MATTER ON APPEAL. 
Sec. 20-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides as 
follo·ws: 
"Appeals shall lie from the final judgments 
of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases 
to the district courts, on both questions of law and 
fact, with such limitations and restrictions as are 
or may be provided by law; and the decisions of 
the district courts on such appeals shall be final, 
except in cases involving the validity or constitu-
tionality of a statute; and appeals shall also lie 
to the district courts from the final judgments 
of the city courts, and from the final judgments 
of the juvenile courts, except where a direct ap-
peal to the supreme court is expressly provided 
for." 
Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide as follows: 
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" (a) F'rom Final Judgments. An appeal 
may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final 
judgments, in accordance with these rules; pro-
vided, that in actions originating in city courts 
and in justices' courts, the decision of the district 
court on appeal shall be final, except: (1) In 
cases involving the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute or ordinance; and (2) In actions ori-
ginating in city courts in which the amount in con-
troversy exceeds $100.00, exclusive of costs." 
The Appellant herein does not anywhere question 
the validity or constitutionality of any City ordinance 
or State statute. The above statutes and rules specifi-
cally provide that the decisions of the District Court on 
such matters as the one he-rein contained shall be final 
unless there is involved a question of the validity or 
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute. Nowhere 
in Appellant's brief does she charge the invalidity or un-
constitutionality of either a City ordinance or State stat-
ute in the matter in question, but, to the contrary, she 
merely claims a misinterpretation of a question of law by 
the District Court concerning a presumption established 
by common law and since changed in Utah by a change 
of circumstances and statutes. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
My statement herein contained and the transcript of 
the testimony taken at the time of trial is overwhelming 
and without contradiction to the effect that the house 
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in question was used by Defendant oYer a long period of 
time as a disorderly house and to the continual and per-
sistent disturbance of the inunediate neighbors, and De-
fendant, in her brief, at page·:s 9 and 10 thereof, admits 
that the evidence discloses a course of conduct existing 
oYer a period of seYeral months prior to the date of 
arrest on ~[ay 12, 1951, which constituted disorderly con-
duct by both colored and white people, young and old, re-
sorting to said place and drinking intoxicating liquor and 
conducting then1selYes in a boisterous and immoral way. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION UNDER UTAH 
LAW THAT A MARRIED WOMAN, WHILE COMMITTING 
A CRIME, IS ACTING UNDER THE COMMAND, COER-
CION OR INFLUENCE OF HER HUSBAND. 
The only point 1nade by Appellant on which there 
can be any argument is whether or not, under Utah law, 
the common law presumption still exists to the effect that 
a married woman is not liable for crime excepting mur-
der and treason com1nitted in the presence of her hus-
band. I first wish to call to the Court's attention Appel-
lant's requested instruction on this point which is herein 
set forth in full in the Statement of Facts and the actual 
instruction given by the trial court which is also set forth 
in full herein in the Statement of F'acts, which instruc-
tion, as given, is even more favorable to the Defendant 
than the one requested. It is my opinion and judgment 
that the trial court went much further than the law re-
quires in the instruction submitted to the jury and by 
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which they were bound in their deliberation. Some few 
states still follow the old common law rule that a married 
woman is not liable for a crime committed in the presence 
of her husband since under the common law it was pre-
sumed that she acted under constraint from him. How-
ever, Utah, as has the majority of the states, enacted 
statutes which modify greatly the common law. Section 
103-1-40, sub-section (8) reads as follows: 
"103-1-40. Who Are Capable of Committing 
Crime. 
All persons are capable of committing crimes, 
except those belonging to the following classes : 
(8) :l\larried women, unless the crime is pun-
ishable with death, acting under the threats, com-
mand or coercion of their husbands." 
It will be noted that this statute constitutes a sub-
stantial departure from the provision of the common 
law whe-rein it was there provided that a married woman 
was not liable for crime excepting 1nurder and treason 
committed in the presence of her husband. It is therefore 
the Respondent's position that it is incumbent upon the 
Defendant to show by competent evidence that her act 
was committed because of or under the threats, command 
or coercion of her husband. It should also be noted 
that Sections 40-2-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, specifically emancipate women in the 
State of Utah and that the old common law theory that 
a husband and wife are one for all purposes is forever 
in the State of Utah dissolved and completely abolished 
and abandoned. 
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The eourts in Yarious jurisdidions base their deci-
:'ions on various theories. It is interesting to note that 
in Tennessee the courts base their decision that the wife 
is no longer under the disability of coverture. I refer to 
the case of Gill c. JlcKinuey,l40 Tenn. 559,205 ~.\V. 416, 
wherein the court said: 
"This supposed duress of the wife by the fact 
of marriage, like all other doctrines, built upon 
the legal identity of husband and wife, must de-
pend upon the disability of the wife by virtue of 
1narriage. The policy of this state is completely 
changed so that married women are no longer 
under the disability of coverture and are com-
pletely emancipated." 
There is then the Kentucky rule that the statute 
providing that a wife holds and owns all of her separate 
estate and may contract destroys the· common law pre-
sumption. In the case of King v. City of Owensboro, 218 
S.W. 297, it \Vas contended that the court should have 
given an instruction that if the defendant sold the liquor 
in the presence of her husband, the law presumes that 
she acted in obedience to his command and under his co-
ercion and that they should find her not guilty. The court 
said: 
"The ru1e is a harsh one at best, and with 
the progress of civilization and the changes by 
wise modern legislation of the relation between 
husband and wife as to the right of property and 
personal control by the husband, it wou1d seem 
absurb in this enlightened age to regard the wife 
as a 1nere machine made to labor and to talk as 
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the husband directs and to make him liable on that 
ground for her torts when not c01nmitted by his 
direction or procurement." 
and concluded by saying: 
"We therefore conclude that there is no 
longer a presumption that a 1narried woman who 
commits a cri1ne conjointly with or in the pres-
ence of her husband acts under his coercion, and 
it follows that the court's failure to instruct the 
jury to that effect was not in error." 
Also, see State v. Hendricks) 32 Kan. 559, 4 P. 1050. 
For a discussion of the rule under the modern mar-
ried woman's acts see Morton v. State) 209 S.W. 644, 
where it was held that the rule of the common law no 
longer exists and a married woman is responsible for her 
crimes as if a femme sole. 
In the case of Wampler v. N ortonJ 134 Ya. 606, 113 
S.E. 733, the court declared in reference to a charge of 
keeping ardent spirits for sale: 
"that the defendant cannot excuse herself 
from guilt upon this or any other sort of criminal 
charge merely by showing the marriage and 
pleading a consequent technical coercion by her 
husband. Thus, for example, when they are living 
together in a house kept for immoral purposes, 
she cannot successfully defend a prosecution 
therefor on the ground that the law presumes her 
to be acting under his control." 
In the case of State v. RenslowJ an Iowa case, 230 
N.W. 316, the court held that the rule of presumptive 
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coercion did not apply to the act of a Inarried woman 
in receiving stolen property frmn her husband. The court 
said: 
"that lmder the statutes of Iowa, where prac-
tically aU of the disabilities and disadvantages of 
coYerture are remoYed and a wmnan stands in the 
eyes of the law with practically all of the rights, 
duties and privileges of a femme sole, we see no 
reason for the further application of this rule in 
this state." 
In the case of Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 34, 
the court said : 
''There were two reasons on which the com-
mon law rule was based. First, that man and 
wife are one, and that one cannot conspire. Sec-
ond, that the husband is presumed to control the 
wife." 
and further concluded: 
"that both these propositions have been aban-
doned and also the legislation in respect to the 
marital relation. The law of this state requires 
the coercion by the husband to be proved." 
In the case of State v. Carpenter, an Idaho case, 
reported in 176 P. 2d 919, the court held that it was not 
in error in failing to give an instruction of the common 
law rule where a wife was convicted of giving hacksaw 
blades to her husband in jail to aid him to escape, stating 
that the common law had been changed by statute. 
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A case directly in point is the case of People v. 
Statley, a California case reported in 206 P. 2d 76. The 
California Statute is identical with the Utah Statute. 
In that case the court quotes from Katz v. Walkinshaw, 
1903, 141 Gal. 116, 122, 123, 70 P. 663, 74 P. 766, 767, 64 
L.R.A. 236, 99 Am. St. Rep. 35 as follows: 
"* * * In Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. (136), 143 
the court approved the following rule * * * 
"'It is contrary to the spirit of the common 
law itself to apply a rule founded on a particular 
reason to a case where that reason utterly fails.' 
* * * 
"The true doctrine is that the common law 
by its own principles adapts itself to varying con-
ditions, and modifies its own rules so as to serve 
the ends of justice under the different circum-
stances-* * * 
" 'When the reason or a rule ceases, so should 
the rule itself. 
"'It is a well-settled rule that the law varies 
with the varying reasons on which it is founded. 
This is expre·ssed by the maxim, "Cessante rati-
one, cessat ipsa lex." This means that no law 
can survive the reasons on which it is founded. 
It needs no statute to change it; it abrogates it-
self. If the reasons on which a law rests are over-
borne, by opposing reasons, which, in the progress 
of society, gain controlling force, the old law, 
though still good as an abstract principle, and 
good in its application to some circumstances, 
must cease to apply or be a controlling principle 
to the new circumstances.'" 
For two good annotations, it is suggested the court 
review 4 A.L.R. 279 and 71 A.L.R. 1123. 
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CONCLUSION 
That the Appellant's appeal be disinissed and that 
the same be ren1anded with instructions to carry out the 
sentence heretofore in1posed by the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOL~IGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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